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Abstract
We hypothesize that cultural appreciation of hard work and thrift, the Protestant ethic according
to Max Weber, had a pre-Reformation origin. The proximate source of these values was, according to
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1 Introduction
In what is surely one of the most famous works in all of social science, Max Weber (1905) argued that
the Protestant Reformation was instrumental in facilitating the rise of capitalism in Western Europe. More
specifically, Weber argued that Protestantism, in contrast to Catholicism, commends the virtues of hard work
and thrift. These values, which Weber famously referred to as the “Protestant ethic”, laid the foundation
for the eventual rise of modern capitalism. Despite its prominence Weber’s hypothesis nevertheless remains
controversial.
The central hypothesis advanced in the present study is that the cultural virtues emphasized by Weber
had a pre-Reformation origin in the Order of Cistercians, a Catholic order which spread across Europe as of
the 11th century, and that this monastic order served to stimulate growth during the second millennium by
encouraging cultural change in local populations. That is, we argue that the Cistercians encouraged growth
by instigating the kind of cultural change that Weber attributed to Protestantism.
The Cistercian order, a Benedictine oﬀshoot, was established in France in 1098 as a reformist movement
with the aim of returning to the literal observance of the “Rule of St. Benedict”. They rejected the
developments the Benedictines had undergone and tried to reproduce life exactly as it had been in St.
Benedict’s time; in fact, they often ventured beyond it in austerity. The salient feature in the reform was
a return to hard manual labor and the restraint from consumption (Kieser 1987). This meant that within
the walls of the Cistercian monasteries one would find cultural values similar to those which, promulgated
by the Protestant Reformation centuries later, is thought to have assisted the rise of capitalism outside the
monastic walls. Several scholars have noted that the simplicity of the Order’s lifestyle and their pursuit of
wealth were in fact early manifestations of “the Protestant ethic” (e.g., Baumol 1990, p. 906; Collins 1986,
p. 54; Kieser 1987, p. 116). Weber (1958, p. 118-119) himself singled out the Cistercians as encompassing
values with a clear antecedent to the Protestant ethic.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that cultural values associated with the Protestant movement started to
spread long before Martin Luther posted his theses on the door of the All Saints’ Church in Wittenberg. Of
course, the cultural influence from the Cistercians was not immediate. Initially, the Cistercians may only
have “convinced” a (potentially very) small group of people to “adopt” their attitudes towards hard work and
thrift. But prior to the fertility transition, in an era where Malthusian forces are at play, work ethic and thrift
translates into economic success and thus reproductive success. To the extent that cultural values carry over
from parent to oﬀspring, a cumulative process of growth through cultural change can be envisioned. If the
pervasiveness of “Protestant-type” cultural values increases, this will stimulate work eﬀort, investments and
technological change; in turn, this works to encourage population growth and, as a consequence of selection,
2
cultural change.1
We construct a simple model that illustrates this cumulative process. To fix ideas, we focus on how
Cistercians may have influenced the attitude towards hard work and thereby macroeconomic development.
Using the model, we demonstrate that an initially small group of dynasties featuring a relatively strong
preference for work eﬀort could plausibly have come to dominate the population within the span of 500
years. Moreover, we show that small diﬀerences in the initial rate of “conversion” to a high work ethic could
result in considerable variations in cultural values in the course of centuries. Finally, we derive an estimable
equation from the model.
As a historical testing ground for the theory we use cross-county data from England, where the Cistercians
arrived early in the 12th century. England is of particular interest as it centuries later turned out to be the
epicenter of the industrial revolution. Moreover, an advantage of examining England is that high quality
regional population data is available from the 13th century onwards, which we employ as our measure of
productivity in keeping with the predictions of the theoretical model.2 In order to proxy the initial cultural
influence from the Cistercians on local populations, we employ information on the historic location of English
Cistercian abbeys at the county level. With this data in hand, we proceed to document that the intensity of
Cistercian presence left an important imprint on comparative development across English counties until 1801;
that is, long after the Dissolution of the Monasteries, which took place between 1536 and 1540.3 Specifically,
we show that, conditional on relevant exogenous controls, English counties with more Cistercian monasteries
experienced faster population growth during the period 1377-1801.4
Correlations should be interpreted with care. We cannot rule out that some omitted factor is driving the
link between Cistercian presence and long-run population growth. But we do examine a rich set of potential
confounders. In addition, we provide IV estimates of the Cistercian/population growth nexus, where we
draw on the work of historians to produce a plausible instrument for the location of Cistercian monasteries
in England. The IV estimates corroborate our OLS findings that the Cistercians had an impact on growth,
even after the monasteries were dissolved. Hence, the weight of the evidence suggests a causal eﬀect running
from Cistercian presence to long-run comparative development in England.
We believe the most plausible interpretation of this finding is that the Cistercians influenced local cultural
1The fundamental influence of parents on children in terms of transmitting cultural values is well established; see Bisin and
Verdier (2000, 2001) and Dohmen et al. (2011). Observe, however, that one may well imagine values gradually spreading across
dynasties, which would work to speed up the process of cultural change (see Dohmen et al. 2011). For evidence on the relevance
of Malthusian dynamics during pre-industrial times, see Ashraf and Galor (2011).
2 See e.g. Ashraf and Galor (2011; 2013) for a similar empirical strategy in a Malthusian setting.
3During 1536-1540 England went through her own version of the Protestant Reformation, which entailed the dissolution of
all monasteries.
4By 1377 most of the Cistercians were settled; only a few additional monasteries emerged after that year. Hence, by selecting
1377 we can treat Cistercian presence as pre-determined. 1801 is chosen to permit the longest possible window of observation
while at the same time ending before the fertility transition in England occurs. After the fertility transition population growth
is no longer a sensible marker of productivity growth.
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values, which subsequently took hold in the population. These new values in turn stimulated growth through
attendant changes in work eﬀort, investment behavior and technological progress. If indeed values changed,
as hypothesized in the present study, it would provide a reasonable explanation for why the influence of the
Cistercians appears to extend itself beyond the Dissolution of the Monasteries.
In order to test this account further, we turn to the present day where it is possible to obtain information
on cultural values. While it is possible to study comparative cultural diﬀerences across England we do not
only follow this track. Instead, we broaden the scope of the analysis to Europe in its entirety. The key
advantages of this approach are that it enables us both to expand the number of observations substantially
and to examine the influence of the Cistercians on sub-samples of individuals that are Catholic today. The
latter check is useful in that current values may well have been influenced by the Reformation as well as by
the Cistercians, which could prevent a clean test of the proposed hypothesis if the Reformation served to
spread “Protestant ethics” across Protestant Europe at large, thereby muting the early influence from the
Cistercians on cultural diﬀerences across individuals living in Protestant regions. So if the hypothesized data
pattern fails to materialize in Catholic sub-samples this cannot be dismissed as the result of a confounding
influence from the Reformation and thus constitutes a good opportunity to reject the hypothesis. However,
we find in fact that the historical presence of the Cistercians predicts contemporary values regarding the
importance of “hard work” and (to a far lesser extent) thrift across European Catholics. These results
carry over if we study English citizens, or individuals living in Western Europe more broadly, as befits
the hypothesis. We also find that the Cistercians appear to have left a long-run legacy on contemporary
employment rates across European sub-regions, consistent with a productivity enhancing eﬀect of the Order
in the presence of a mobile labor force.
To be sure, it is impossible to establish definitively that our results with regard to contemporary or
historical economic outcomes are solely attributable to a cultural impact of the Order. For instance, the
Cistercians were highly innovative and fostered early industrial developments, as explained below. If the
pace of technology diﬀusion was suﬃciently slow across English counties during the second millennium, this
may also have influenced growth beyond the period where Cistercians were active in England, and it may
also account for the impact on employment that we detect across European sub-regions. Yet our analysis of
the nexus between the Cistercians and values today makes probable that cultural change very likely is part
of the story.
The present research is related to the literature which examines the influence from religious values on
economic activity (e.g., Landes 1999; Barro and McCleary 2003; Guiso et al. 2006; McCleary and Barro 2006;
Becker and Woessmann 2009; Cantoni 2009). Whereas most studies explore the “Weberian transmission
mechanism”, Landes (1999) and Becker and Woessmann (2009) propose that the Protestant Reformation
led to a higher appreciation of literacy due to the new religious dogma, which required Protestants to be
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able to read the Bible in their own language. While Landes also admits an important role for the Weber
mechanism, Becker and Woessmann (2009) find little evidence of an influence from what Weber called “the
Protestant ethic” for comparative development across Prussia.
More broadly, our theory is related to studies that propose that changes in the composition of the
population aﬀect long-run development in fundamental ways; whether such changes were cultural (e.g.,
Clark 2007; Doepke and Zilibotti 2008) or of a genetic nature (Galor and Moav 2002; Ashraf and Galor,
2013). We diﬀer from these contributions in emphasizing a shock to cultural values, viz. the settlement of
the Cistercians. This allows us to test our argument statistically.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on the Order of the Cister-
cians and develops a model that shows how Cistercian values could spread beyond the Order itself thereby
influencing productivity and population growth in a Malthusian environment. Section 3 contains our em-
pirical analysis of historical England, where we demonstrate that the Cistercians appear to have influenced
productivity growth in a manner consistent with the proposed hypothesis. Section 4 then takes a step fur-
ther and examines whether the legacy of the Cistercians can be detected across contemporary Europe. In
this regard, we examine both whether the Cistercians appear to have influenced the pervasiveness of values
hitherto regarded as being of Protestant origin, i.e., thrift and “hard work”, as well as whether the historical
location of Cistercian monasteries predicts contemporary economic outcomes. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 Theory: The Cistercians and Why they Mattered
2.1 The Order of Cistercians
The Cistercian order was founded in 1098 in France; the first Cistercian monastery in England was founded
in 1128 (Cooke 1893; Donkin 1963). During the 12th century the Order spread rapidly across England, cf.
Figure 1. By the end of the 14th century the expansion of the Order had essentially ceased. Hence from the
perspective of our regression analysis below, which mainly involves the time period from 1377 onwards, we
can treat Cistercian settlements as predetermined.
There is little doubt that the Cistercians held beliefs which were later to be associated with the Protestant
ethic. By seeking to return to a literal interpretation of the Rule of St. Benedict, the small book written in
the sixth century by its namesake, they stressed the trinity of prayer, work and study, as well as the values
of practicality, adaptability, simplicity and moderation (Hill 1968, p. 3). The Exordium Cistercii, written
5Hence, in this latter respect our work is related to Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), who tests whether historical slave trade -
an external shock from the point of view of the individual - has had a lasting impact on cultural values across Africans in ways
of reduced trust.
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Figure 1: Frequency of founding years of Cistercian monasteries in England.
in the 1120s, and the statutes promulgated at the general chapter of 1134, stated that the monks were to
work hard and live “from the labour of their own hands, from cultivation and from their flocks”. They were
also to live frugally, and were not permitted to have any possessions “contrary to monastic purity” such as
parish churches, the tithes of other men’s labor, dependent peasants, mills, ovens, or other income sources
attached to the land. Hence it is no surprise that Baumol (1990, p. 906) suggests that the monks of the
Order of Cistercians may have embodied an earlier “Protestant ethic”: “Puritanical, at least in the earlier
years, in their self-proclaimed adherence to simplicity in personal lifestyle while engaged in dedicated pursuit
of wealth, they may perhaps represent an early manifestation of elements of ‘the Protestant ethic’”. Collins
(1986, p. 54) is slightly more direct when he notes that the Cistercians: “had the Protestant ethic without
Protestantism”.6
The simplicity of the Cistercians was thus only a liturgical simplicity, replacing long days of ritual with
short prayers that could be said in pauses from labor (Bouchard 1991; Hill 1968). Moreover, “useless” labor,
such as painting pictures, decorating books, breeding useless animals, etc. was banned (Kieser 1987). Some
have suggested that they were attempting to reduce the need for manual labor in order to leave more time
for prayer (Bloch 1935; Gimpel 1976; Ovitt 1986; Landes 1999). Whatever the case, from the very beginning
the Cistercians were involved in the rapidly developing economic practices of the 12th century, and were in
6Kiefer (1987, p. 116) makes the same observation.
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some cases initiators of these practices. Moreover, the monks’ asceticism, by keeping down consumption,
drove up levels of investment (Kiefer 1987; Baumol 1990).
Kaelber (1998) points out that Weber himself saw monastic asceticism as a clear precursor to ascetic
Protestantism, the key driving force behind European capitalism according to Weber. More specifically,
as argued by Weber (1958, p. 118-19): “In the rules of St. Benedict, even more so in the case of the
monks of Cluny and the Cistercians...[Christian asceticism] has become a systematically developed method of
rational life conduct, with the goal to overcome the status naturae, to free man from the power of irrational
impulses and his dependence on the world and on nature...It attempted to subject man under the supremacy
of purposive will, to bring his action under constant self-control with a careful consideration of their ethical
consequences. Thus it trained the monk, objectively, as a worker in the service of the Kingdom of God, and
thereby further, subjectively, assured the salvation of his soul. . . [T]he end of this asceticism was to be able to
lead an alert, intelligent life: the most urgent task the destruction of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment, the
most important means was to bring order into the conduct of its adherents. All these important points are
emphasized in the rules of Catholic monasticism as strongly as in the principles of conduct of the Calvinists.”
Hence the idea that the Cistercians held values close to those promulgated by the Protestant Reformation
has a long and distinguished tradition.7
The emphasis on hard work and thrift made the Cistercians entrepreneurial and ultimately very successful
economically (Baumol 1990). They contributed much as agriculturists and as horse and cattle breeders. Their
major contribution was the introduction of the grange system, whereby land was held in compact blocks, in
contrast to the usual fragmented and unenclosed village holdings (Donkin 1963). Another contribution seems
to have been advanced irrigation techniques, thus predating Rowland Vaughan’s famous popularization of
these methods by centuries.8 Moreover, their high level of agricultural technology was matched by their
industrial technology. Every monastery had a model factory, often as large as the church, with waterpower
to drive the machinery (Gimpel 1976). This power was used for crushing wheat, sieving flour, fulling cloth
and tanning (Baumol 1990). The Cistercians are also known to have been skilled metallurgists (Gimpel
1976).
The Cistercian monastic system was one based on the principle of kinship, and thus Cistercian work
practices and technology seem to have spread easily from house to house (Donkin 1978). These values in
turn spread into the local area partly due to the Cistercian practice of incorporating illiterate peasant lay
brothers (known as conversi) for agricultural labor (Berman 2000). Lay brothers were bound by vows of
chastity and obedience to their abbot, but were otherwise permitted to follow a less demanding form of
7As Weber points out, similar values were found among the Cluniacs. The impact of the Cluny order has received scant
attention in the literature in comparison with the Cistercians. Yet, as we shall see, they do not seem to have left a mark on
pre-industrial growth in England.
8Vaughan’s Golden Valley was actually located in an area where the Cistercians had held extensive estates prior to the
Dissolution (Cook, Stearne and Williamson 2003).
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Cistercian life. Work on Cistercian granges was also carried out by various classes of secular laborers. These
included servi (servants), mercenarii (hired laborers), familiares (workers with intermediate status between
hired workmen and lay brothers) and donate or oblate (pious laymen exchanging work for support). The
exact fraction of lay brothers to these other types of labor is diﬃcult to determine, but the latter seem to
have become increasingly important at the turn of the 13th century (Noell 2006). Another important group
of settlers in the abbeys were the corrodians, who spent their years of retirement there. Moreover, settled
communities, including shopkeepers, formed outside the monasteries (Williams 1970). In this manner, the
ways of the Cistercians spread beyond the Order itself; by power of demonstration, by word of mouth, or
both.
If indeed the Cistercians influenced the values of local populations it is easy to envision how the process
would become cumulative. Up until the fertility transition, which occurs in England around 1880 (e.g.,
Hatton and Martin 2010), households with greater earnings capabilities would proliferate at a greater rate
(e.g., Clark 2007; Ashraf and Galor 2011). As a consequence, families valuing hard work and thrift should
be expected to have more oﬀspring. Provided cultural values are transmitted from generation to generation
(e.g., Dohmen et al. 2011), the share of the population featuring the new values would gradually rise. As
the fraction of the population with greater earnings capabilities increased there would be a positive feed-
back to overall population growth. In this manner, the initial cultural influence from the Cistercians would
eventually have a macroeconomic impact on population density.
2.2 A Model of Growth through Cultural Change
In order to think more formally about how the ways of the Cistercians spread beyond the Order itself,
and the ensuing macroeconomic impact, we construct a growth model designed to elucidate the long-run
consequences of cultural change with respect to work ethics in a Malthusian environment. The model can
be seen as a slight extension of the basic Malthusian framework (Ashraf and Galor 2011), to a situation
where labor supply is endogenous. This extension allows us to have a simple representation of greater work
ethics: reduced utility value of leisure. As a result, we can study the process of cultural change that is
unleashed by a work-inducing preference shock to a subset of the population. Eventually the shock leads to
greater aggregate population density, as a consequence of selection of individuals with a greater appreciation
of work. By focusing on the impact of changes in the attitude to work we suppress changes in cultural
attitudes towards saving and investment; i.e., thrift. It is worth observing, however, that while the model
focuses on the work ethic of individuals, similar results would arise if we instead examined thrift. As long
as thrift implies a greater earnings potential, groups with high thriftiness will be selected in the Malthusian
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setting thereby propelling aggregate population density.9
2.2.1 Individuals’ optimization
We are considering a closed OLG economy with one good. Time is discrete and extends to infinity,  =
0 1 2∞. Individuals live for two periods. During the first period of life individuals are children and
live oﬀ their parents’ consumption. During their second period individuals decide on labor supply and use
the proceeds to rear oﬀspring and for consumption. For simplicity, individuals are assumed to reproduce
asexually; in the model there is therefore no distinction between a household and an individual.
Individuals derive utility from consumption, , oﬀ-spring, , and leisure, 1 − . The utility function,
 (  ), is quasi-linear:
 (  ) = log () +  log () +  (1− )  (1)
where  and  are positive parameters.10 The individual’s budget constraint is
 =  +   (2)
where  is potential income and  is the output cost of a child. Optimal fertility and eﬀort is given by11
 = ()  (3)
 =  = (1 + )  (4)
Hence, if the taste for leisure, , declines, labor supply expands, and fertility increases. The latter is caused
by the fact that as income goes up some of the gain is used for consumption and some is converted into
larger families.
2.2.2 Production
Output in the economy,  , is produced using technology, , labor, , and land, :  =  1−.
Following Galor and Weil (2000) we assume that individuals’ income is given by the average product of labor
9Becker (1980) explores a dynamic economy where agents diﬀer in terms of the rate of time preference; i.e., in terms of
“thrift”. In the long run the most patient dynasty ends up “owning” the economy. Below we demonstrate a similar result in
that dynasties with greater work ethics will end up dominating the population.
10The quasi-linearity of the utility function ensures time invariance of , and thus that increases in income are converted
into larger families on a one-to-one basis. Accordingly, these preferences allow us to lay out the logic of the argument in a
particularly simple and transparent way.
11 In the interest of brevity we suppress the solution for consumption in the text. It is straightforward to solve for optimal 
by inserting the solutions for  and  into the budget constraint.
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so that potential income of the individual is  ≡  =  ()1−.12
2.2.3 Macro Dynamics: Cultural homogeneity
The size of population at  + 1 is given by the number of individuals at time  multiplied by their number
of oﬀspring, +1 =  Inserting the solution for optimal family size, , and the expression for potential
income, we obtain
+1 = () 1− ≡  ()  0 given.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that the model allows for a unique and globally stable steady state, ∗,
with ∗ thus fulfilling +1 =  = ∗ and ∗ =  (∗). In the steady state population size is given by
∗ =
µ

¶1(1−)
 (5)
In the steady state we obtain the standard comparative statics with respect to   , , and  (see Ashraf and
Galor 2011). In addition, the present model contains the prediction that if preferences for leisure declines
(i.e.,  declines) population density rises in the long run; greater preference for labor supply allows for greater
fertility and thus a larger population in the long run.
2.2.4 Macro Dynamics: Cultural heterogeneity
In order to study cultural change in the population at large in the present setting we need a shock to ignite
the process. Accordingly, we assume that an arbitrarily small subset of society develops a greater taste for
work. That is, a preference alteration emerges such that for a group of citizens  declines to ˜   The
source of the change is left unspecified but it could be thought of as resulting from religious persuasion,
which we think of as an exogenous shock from the point of view of the individual.
The economy subsequently nests two types of individuals; people with relatively low valuation of leisure,
˜, and the rest, ˆ. Otherwise the two groups are identical. We assume preferences are passed on from one
generation to the next ensuring the initial one-oﬀ shock persists.13
After the shock to preferences the relative size of the two groups will evolve in accordance with14
ˆ+1
˜+1 =
˜ˆ
˜ 
If we define  ≡ ˆ˜ the above equation can be viewed as a linear first order diﬀerence equation in ,
12 Since individuals only supply  units of time, the actual income of an individual is  =  ()−1.
13 See Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) and Dohmen et al. (2011) for evidence on the “inheritability” of values.
14For each group, +1 = ()  holds. The equation in the text emerges by dividing them while recalling only  diﬀers.
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which can be solved so as to yield
 = 0
µ ˜

¶

Obviously, lim→∞  = 0 since ˜   By implication, the share of the total population, which belongs to
the high eﬀort group, evolves in accordance with
˜
 ≡
˜
˜ + ˆ =
1
1 + 0
³ ˜

´  (6)
As is readily seen, lim→∞ ˜ = 1. Since one group has a reproductive advantage over the other, the former
will eventually dominate the population in its totality.
Turning to aggregate dynamics, the total population evolves in accordance with:
+1 = ( ˜) ˜ + () 
³
 − ˜
´

which can be rewritten, using equation (6), as the following law of motion for population:
+1 =  1− ≡  ( )  0 given, (7)
where
 ≡ 
(1˜)− (1)
1 + 0
³ ˜

´ +   0 given.
Hence, after the shock the law of motion is aﬀected by the time autonomous factor , which reflects the
influence from cultural change. As the fraction of the population with greater preference for work increases,
 shifts upwards over time. Asymptotically, when  → 0, the law of motion will only reflect the preferences
of the ˜ type.
The phase diagram for the economy, which is depicted in Figure 2, illustrates the adjustment dynamics
after a small group in society changes values at time  = 0. Since the new group works harder, its income
is greater. This works to increase population density relative to the initial situation where all individuals
held the same preference for leisure, . However, initially the high work ethic group may be very small,
for which reason the immediate impact on aggregate population size could be miniscule. But since the
hard working group holds a reproductive advantage, the group’s population share gradually rises over time,
thereby increasingly stimulating aggregate population size. The rise in importance of the new cultural values
is reflected in the upward shifts in the law of motion for population size depicted in Figure 2. Eventually,
the group with greater work ethics will dominate the population, and the economy convergences to a steady
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Figure 2: Phase diagram for the model with cultural heterogeneity.
state where population size reflects the preferences of the high work ethic group. In the steady state
∗ =
µ
˜
¶1(1−)

Since ˜   it follows that the impact of the cultural change has been to elevate population density (cf.
equation (5)).
The model thus shows how a change in a certain cultural attitude in a small subset of the population
may rise in importance due to selective pressures and eventually influence the macroeconomy. The source
of the change of preferences is left unexplained by the model. But it seems plausible that the Cistercians
have influenced county populations in this manner, as argued in Section 2.1. Accordingly, our hypothesis is
that Cistercians planted the seeds of change by aﬀecting the cultural attitudes; or, more appropriately, the
work ethic of a (in principle arbitrarily) small part of the county population. By so doing, they instigated a
process of growth through cultural change.
2.2.5 Speed of Diﬀusion
A question of some relevance is how fast the cultural diﬀusion process played out if it only emanates from
diﬀerential population growth rates across dynasties with diﬀerent values. Naturally, the process would
conceivably occur at a faster rate than what we find below if values gradually diﬀuse across dynasties as
12
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Figure 3: The rise of new cultural values in the population. Assumptions: (a) 20% higher work eﬀort among
individuals with “high” work eﬀort”. (b) Initial “infection” rate: 1/1000 (solid black), 1/100 (dashed), 1/10
(dotted).
well, following the initial shock to a select group of dynasties. In practice, both mechanisms may have been
at work.
In order to examine the speed of population-growth driven cultural change, observe that the fraction of
individuals with high work ethic at time  is
 ≡ ˜ =
1
1 + 0
³ ˜

´  (8)
The speed at which ˜ becomes dominant in society depends on how much more eﬀort the high work ethic
group exerts, ˜ =
ˆ
˜  as well as how many individuals were “persuaded” to change their values as of time
 = 0. The ratio of ’s is hard to pin down in any precise manner. But suppose the high work-ethic group
works 20% more than the other group.15 In this case Figure 3 shows how the new cultural values grow in
significance over time for diﬀerent assumptions about the initial degree of cultural change; that is, 0 = 01%,
1% and 10% of the population, respectively.
15Clark and Van der Werf (1998) estimate that the number of days worked per year (standard deviation in parenthesis) rose
in England from 266 (4.8) in 1560-99 to 280 (12.9) in 1771. Suppose this increase is attributable to the rise of the Protestant
work ethic, resulting from the Cistercian presence and the Reformation. Then the estimated increase over time in work days
provides a crude guesstimate for the ratio ˜. Factoring in the statistical uncertainty we may note that working days in 1771
may have been between 5% lower and 23% higher than in 1560, with a mean around +10%. Hence, assuming a 20% higher
work eﬀort may not be unrealistic.
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The spread of the new cultural values follows an S-shaped trajectory: the process is slow to begin with
but accelerates over time and ultimately levels oﬀ. Consider the curve in the middle, associated with an
initial degree of cultural change of 1%. The first 10 generations only raise the fraction with strong work ethic
modestly (to about 6%), the next 10 generations increase the share to 30% of the population, and another
five to nearly 50%. If a generation is about 20 years, 25 generations (what it takes to go from 1% to 50%)
is about 500 years. The point is that, within the window of observation available to us (about 500 years),
it is possible for a small (initial) cultural shock from the Cistercians to accumulate into a major aggregate
impact on the composition of the population solely by way of selective pressure.
Another point worth emphasizing is the implied comparative diﬀerences in cultural values that seemingly
small initial diﬀerences translates into. With an initial infection rate, 0, of one percent, 50 percent of the
population holds a high work ethic after 25 generations; but only eight percent have high work ethic after
25 generations if the initial infection rate is 1/10th of a percentage point. This implies that, by aﬀecting 0,
variations in the intensity of Cistercian presence may have generated substantial comparative diﬀerences in
cultural values across English counties over the period in question. It may therefore be possible to detect
the legacy of the Cistercians on population dynamics over the period 1377-1801, which we examine below.
3 The Impact of the Cistercians on Productivity across Historical
England
This section proceeds in a series of steps. We begin by deriving an empirical model based on the theoretical
model from the previous section. Subsequently, in Section 3.2 we present our data, Section 3.3 contains our
OLS regression results, whereas Section 3.4 reports our IV results.
3.1 Empirical Specification
The theory predicts that changes in population can be written (taking logs in equation (7)):
log (+1)− log () = (− 1) log () + log () + log () 
where we may write:
 ≡  [(1˜)− (1)] +

 
with , recall, denoting the proportion of individuals with high work ethics in the population. If we linearize
log () around  = 0 we obtain log  ≈ log
³


´
+  [(1˜)− (1)] which can be reinserted into the
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equation for population growth so as to yield
log (+1)− log () ≈ (− 1) log () + log () + log
µ 

¶
+  [(1˜)− (1)]
Finally, denoting a county by  and adding an error term, we arrive at the empirical model
∆ log (+1) = 0 + 1 log () + 2 + Z0a+ 
where ∆ log (+1) ≡ log (+1)− log () and Z contains time-invariant controls for productivity ().
Naturally, we do not have data on . But, according to the theory, we may proxy it using some measure
of Cistercian presence in the county, as it should influence 0 and thereby  (see equation (8)). We define
this intensity as the Cistercian presence relative to other moral influences. Since the Church was the principal
authority in matters of moral in medieval times, we construct  as the ratio of Cistercian monasteries, ,
to all religious houses; i.e.  = . However, the counterfactual we are interested in is that of changing
the composition of moral influences while at the same time holding constant its level. This dictates that we
also control for the total number of religious houses,  , separately.
Hence, our main empirical specification reads as follows:
∆ log (+1) = 0 + 1 log () + 2 () + 3 + Z0a+  (9)
Ceteris paribus, areas with more Cistercians saw a larger fraction of the population initially being “per-
suaded” by the Cistercian work ethic. As seen from Figure 3 this should imply a higher  at any given
point in time, stimulating growth according to the model. As a result, we expect 2 to come out with a
positive sign. In addition, theory predicts that 1  0, capturing convergence eﬀects. The coeﬃcient 3 is a
priori indeterminate.
There are clearly other ways in which one could introduce the influence from the Cistercians into the
empirical model, aside from the choice made in specifying equation (9). For instance, Cistercian monasteries
could enter linearly (i.e., 2 + 3), or one could introduce a dummy variable (present/not present) in
order to gauge their impact. We explore such alternatives below, with little eﬀect on the results.
Before we turn to a description of our data two remarks on the testing strategy are warranted. First,
when examining the proposed hypothesis we are studying the period 1377-1801. More specifically, we have
county-level data on population density at several points in time: in 1377 (right after the Cistercians had
completed their settlement in England); 1600 (shortly after the Dissolution of the Monasteries); and in 1801.
It is obviously important that this period, in its entirety, is a period during which English population growth
is likely to be a sensible marker of productivity growth. We believe this is a plausible assumption as England
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did not go through the fertility transition until around 1880 (e.g., Hatton and Martin 2010). To be clear,
the fact that the industrial revolution (may have) occurred earlier in England is immaterial to the present
empirical analysis, as long as the productivity gains it brought about resulted in faster population growth,
which it should have done until the onset of the fertility transition.
Second, we have made no mention of migration in the discussion above. Yet productivity gains in
one county could plausibly attract immigrants from lagging counties. This is observationally equivalent to
population growth arising from higher fertility. While we cannot distinguish between these two alternatives,
a positive influence from the Cistercians on population growth will in any case testify to a productivity
enhancing eﬀect from this particular religious order.16
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Population density
Our dependent variable is population density. We obtained data on population density for the year 1377
from Campbell (2008). Campbell also provides the area of the counties; we transformed them from square
miles into square kilometers. The distribution of the population in 1377 is based on 1.38 million adult males
and females who contributed to the poll tax of 1377.17 The level of the population is based on an estimate
by Campbell (2000) of a total population of 4 million. Campbell only reports population numbers for the
aggregate of London and Middlesex, not for the two counties separately. In order to match the data, all data
on all variables is aggregated in this way. Yet we end up excluding London and Middlesex in all regressions,
since it is an outlier. We note for completeness, however, that including London and Middlesex makes no
diﬀerence to our results. We also have data on population density in 1600, which is taken from Broadberry
et al. (2010). Finally, population density in 1801 is from Wrigley (2007). The latter data are based on
registered marriages, which were more completely recorded than baptisms and burials on which previous
population estimates were based (Rickman, 1802).18
3.2.2 Religious Houses
In controlling for Cistercian presence, as well as of other religious orders, we rely on the English Monastic
Archive (EMA), which has been constructed by researchers at University College London. The database
16 In order to distinguish between the two cases we would need county level data on income per capita, which does not exist.
If productivity induces migration, income per capita should increase as a result from Cistercian presence; the same is not true
if fertility is the driver. See Ashraf and Galor (2011) for further discussion and tests on cross-country data.
17These numbers are available in Dobson (1983).
18Campbell (2008) also reports population data for 1290 based on taxable wealth. But since about 10% of Cistercian
settlement occurred around that time, the risk of reverse causality tainting our estimations would be enhanced if we used 1290
as our initial year. As a result we stick with 1377 as the initial date in our main analysis. However, in the IV setting we do
explore the consequence of extending the period of observation to 1290-1801.
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involves 776 religious houses in England, which date from the 10th to the 16th century. We gathered
these data into one dataset, which we then used to calculate the number of religious houses in each county
(religious houses) and the number of Cistercian monasteries as a share of total religious houses in each county
(Cistercian share). We also construct the share of Benedictine monasteries (Benedictine share), as well as
shares associated with Augustinians, Cluny, and the Premonstratensian Monastic Orders.
Taken together these monastic orders accounted for 3/4 of the 776 religious houses in England as recorded
by the EMA. The Benedictine Order was the largest, accounting for roughly 30% of all religious houses.
The Cistercians accounted for circa 10% or about the same as the Premonstratensians and Cluniacs taken
together. Finally the Augustinians accounted for about 26% of the total religious houses.
We made one correction to the data with respect to the city of York, which was listed in EMA as a
county. York was (is) a walled city situated in North Yorkshire. To be able to match the data with the data
on population density, we re-coded it as part of the county of North Yorkshire.
3.2.3 Other controls
In order to control for potential steady state determinants of productivity, we control for a range of plausible
correlates with “” Specifically, we control for land quality in order to capture productivity in a predomi-
nantly agrarian society such as England during most of the period in question. In addition, we control for
access to ocean, as well as to rivers. As coal arguably played a key role in the industrialization process (Allen
2009; Pomeranz 2000), occurring at the end of our observation window, we also include a control for physical
availability of this resource across counties. Moreover, we employ a full set of regional fixed eﬀects to control
for unobserved heterogeneity. Details on this data are found in the Appendix.
Table 1 provides summary statistics and a correlation matrix of key variables discussed above.
[Table1 about here]
As a prelude for things to come, it is worth observing from Table 1 that  (Cistercian share)
is negatively correlated with population density in 1377, yet positively correlated with population density
in 1801; both correlations are significant at a ten percent level of confidence (p-values of 0.08 and 0.09,
respectively). In the middle of the period, in 1600, the correlation is essentially nil. As explained in Section
3.4, the Cistercians had a preference for locating in sparsely populated areas, which likely explains the
negative correlation in 1377. And yet, the correlation changes markedly during the ensuing roughly 500
years, consistent with a productivity enhancing influence from the Order beyond the Dissolution of the
Monasteries in the 1530s. One may also observe that a similar time-varying correlation is not found between
population density and any other religious order.
Figure 4 provides a complementary perspective. The figure shows the evolution of average population
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Figure 4: The figure compares average population density (persons/km2) in areas where at least one Cister-
cian monastery was found to areas without Cistercian monasteries.
density in areas that were “treated” by Cistercians (i.e., areas that hosted at least one Cistercian monastery)
and those that were not.19
It is interesting to note that prior to the Dissolution of the Monasteries, there seems to be little diﬀerence
between areas “treated” by Cistercians and those that were not (if anything, population growth is faster
in the latter areas). However, after the Dissolution divergence seems to take place. This is consistent with
(though, obviously, not proof of) a gradually accelerating impact from cultural change, as predicted by the
model. At the same time, these patterns seem more diﬃcult to square with a hypothesis according to which
the Cistercians impacted growth via technological change. In this case one would surely expect to see an
impact on population dynamics while the monasteries were physically in place. Still, many factors might
simultaneously impact on cross-county population growth. Hence, in the remaining we resort to regression
analysis in order to elicit information about the partial impact from the Order of Cistercians.
19A total of eight counties were left “untreated”: Berkshire, Cambridgeshire, Cornwall, Derbyshire, Durham, Hertfordshire,
Rutland and Westmorland.
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3.3 OLS Results
Table 2 reports our baseline model. In all columns of the table we control for initial population density,
the total number of religious houses, the share of all religious houses which are Cistercian, and the most
obvious productivity control: agricultural land quality. The regression in column 1 shows that these variables
collectively hold significant explanatory power with respect to population growth over the period 1377-1801.
The baseline model explains almost two thirds of the variation in the dependent variable.
In column 2 we add the regional fixed eﬀects. The null hypothesis that the regional dummies are jointly
zero cannot be rejected at conventional levels (p-value = 0.49). This means that, conditional on our baseline
controls, regional eﬀects appear unimportant. Columns 3-6 add controls one by one; column 7 estimates the
full model, which involves our baseline controls along with the additional confounders that were found to be
statistically significant in columns 3 to 6. In this latter specification we can account for about three quarters
of the variation in population growth from 1377-1801.
Several features of the results are noteworthy. First, the share of Cistercians stays statistically significant
in all columns. This means that the composition of religious houses seems to matter, with a larger share
of Cistercians being associated with greater population growth. In addition, Cistercian point estimates are
fairly stable, always situated in the interval [17 20]. Second, while initial population density displays
the expected conditional convergence feature, it is surprising that agricultural land quality has a negative
impact on population growth. A simple explanation might be that population density in 1377 is measured
with error, and that land quality partly serves to correct for it. This is certainly possible as land quality
is correlated with population density in 1377, cf. Table 1b. Thus the point estimate might simply reflect
convergence: places with greater initial density (good soil conditions) would be expected to grow at a slower
rate. Third, land area adds significant explanatory power, whereas the physical infrastructure of rivers
does not seem to matter for population growth, perhaps suggesting that neither irrigation nor water-based
transportation were significant binding constraints to growth. Fourth, our coal control variable is significant.
This is consistent with Allen (2009) and Pomeranz (2000), who both argue that proximity to coal production
was critical for British industrialization because it supplied an inexhaustible supply of cheap energy, which
may have stimulated growth.
[Table 2 about here]
Figure 5 provides a visual depiction of the relationship between the share of Cistercians and the growth
rate in population as estimated by column 7, Table 2. The partial correlation does not appear to be driven
by outliers.
As explained in Section 3.1, the information we wish to elicit pertains to changing the composition of
religious houses, holding constant its level. Other variations of the theme are obviously possible beyond the
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Figure 5: The partial correlation between Cistercians and population growth, 1377-1801. Notes: The plot
illustrates the regression results reported in Table 2, column 7.
introduction of . For instance, one option would be to use the total number of Cistercian monasteries,
in which case the partial eﬀect is assumed to be constant. Another option would be to simply use a dummy
variable indicating Cistercian presence. Yet another variation we will consider is the number of Cistercian
houses per unit area. This variable will become useful in Section 4 when we examine the impact of the
Cistercians across Europe, an area where we lack data on total religious houses.
Table 3 reports the results using these alternative indicators of Cistercian influence. Columns 1 to 4
show that in the baseline model little is changed in terms of statistical significance when using the diﬀerent
Cistercian variables. However, using our preferred variable, cistercianshare, leads to a higher 2 in the
baseline model. The same is true for the augmented model, as immediately seen upon inspecting columns 5
to 8. In the full model, however, the dummy variable is a borderline statistically insignificant predictor of
population density growth (p-value of 0.102).
[Table 3 about here]
While the Cistercians (however measured) appear to be positively correlated with population growth
1377-1801, one may reasonably wonder if this apparent influence is unique to this particular monastic order.
In an eﬀort to learn the answer we re-ran the regressions in Table 2, replacing the Order of Cistercians with
the share of the total number of monasteries that were Benedictine; the order from which the Cistercians
originated. In stark contrast to the Cistercians, the Benedictine order does not seem to be associated with
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faster population growth over the period. The point estimate is close to zero, sometimes even featuring the
“wrong” sign, and it is always statistically insignificant. The details of the results can be found in Appendix
Table A1, which documents that the Order of Cistercians convey diﬀerent information about population
growth than the order from which they originated. In Appendix Table A2 we further examine whether
the Cistercians hold a diﬀerential impact on population growth compared to other religious orders. In these
exercises we include the Cistercians alongside the Augustinians, the Cluniacs, the Premonstratensians as well
as the Benedictines. We once again find that only the Cistercians appear to be correlated with population
growth over the period.
Accordingly, a positive correlation between the intensity of Cistercian presence and population growth
1377-1801 appears reasonably robust, and statistically diﬀerent from the link between population growth
and any other major religious order present at the time. Yet a legitimate concern is whether the positive
correlation reflects a causal influence from the Cistercians or perhaps simply the influence from omitted
factors. We address this concern next.
3.4 Endogenous Location of Cistercian Monasteries: IV Results
An objection to the preceding results is that they could be spurious. That is, perhaps the Cistercians simply
chose to locate in areas with a pronounced productive potential?
Based on the historical evidence, however, this seems unlikely. The Order had a stated preference for
situating their monasteries in remote, even devastated locations (Cooke 1893; Donkin 1963). Indeed, it
has long been accepted by scholars that the Cistercians acted as transformers of wastelands into fertile
farms, as mirrored in the poet Wordsworth’s Cistercian Monastery.20 The fact that Cistercian presence is
negatively correlated with initial population density (see Table 1b) provides some formal corroboration of
these assessments. Nevertheless, in order to check we further scrutinize the Cistercian/population growth
nexus using instrumental variables estimation.
The Cistercians had a particular preference for locating in secluded and sparsely populated areas, as
explained above. At the time of arrival the most secluded areas may well have been the forests owned by the
Crown: royal forests.21 As Donkin (1963, p. 184) observes: “..there is a really significant connection with
the Royal Forests; one-third of all the English [Cistercian] houses lay at first within or very near their bounds
[...]. In these areas there was a good deal of land of low value for endowments; nonroyal landowners were
gravely hampered by the forest laws; and, as elsewhere, prospective founders undoubtedly responded to the
willingness of the early generations of monks to exploit rough, undeveloped country.” Thus, there may well
20 “Where’er they rise, the sylvan waste retires, And aery harvests crown the fertile lea.”
21The concept of a royal forest was introduced in England by the Normans in the 11th century. They were protected areas
of land (not necessarily woodland) where the king had privileged hunting rights under the “forest law”, which oﬀered strict
penalties to anyone using these areas for hunting or farming.
21
have been a double coincidence of wants. Nonroyal landowners, wanting to save their souls, had an interest
in allowing Cistercians to settle at or near royal forests, which were of limited value beyond the occasional
hunt with the monarch. At the same time, this location satisfied the ascetic needs of the Cistercian settlers.
Finally, the monarch may also have had an incentive to encourage the practise. Madden (1963) notes that
the king likely granted rights of pasture over wide tracts of the royal lands and forests because the Cistercians
were willing to pay for this service using revenue from sale of wool; wool which derived from sheep using
the royal lands for grazing. Hence the presence of a royal forest in a county could be a potentially viable
instrument for Cistercian settlements.
We obtained data on the location of royal forests in the 13th century from Bazeley (1921). Based on the
maps constructed by Bazeley, we constructed a dummy variable: Rforest, which is equal to one if a royal
forest were to be found in the county in the 13th century. Accordingly, we expect to find a positive partial
eﬀect of royal forest on the intensity of Cistercian settlements.
One potential problem with the use of Rforest as an instrument for the intensity of Cistercian presence
is that it might capture resource growth. The royal forest system was at its height in the late 12th and
early 13th century. But already in 1215 Magna Carta laid down limits to the power of the monarchy in the
forests, and the Great Perambulation of 1300 reduced the scale of the forests. Hence, counties with royal
forests may have experienced growth in agricultural land area, as the importance of royal forests receded.22
To alleviate this cause for concern we add a new control variable, based on Bazelay’s map, which measures
the size of the county area that was covered by royal forest in the 13th century as a share of the total county
area: forest share. Needless to say, places with greater forest area should be places where the scope for
growth in land area is greater once the royal forests start to recede. Thus, adding forest share to the control
set should make the excludability of Rforest in the second stage plausible.
However, another potential problem is that if Rforest predicts the location of the Cistercians, it might
also predict the location of other religious houses. This too might jeopardize identification. Of course, our
OLS results give us no particular reason to expect that, say, the Benedictine order influenced growth. But
since the OLS results could be biased these findings are hardly definitive. As a result, one might legitimately
worry about identification if Rforest predicts other religious orders.
In order to gauge the likely severity of this concern we ran regressions that correspond to the first stage
results reported below, but exchanging Cistercians for other religious houses: Augustinians, Premonstraten-
sians, Cluniacs and Benedictines. As seen from Appendix Table A3, Rforest is never a significant predictor
of the intensity (or presence) of any of these orders. Hence, the exclusion restriction is unlikely to be violated
22We have admittedly been unable to find examples of historical writings hypothesizing that land expansion, prompted by
deforestation, had an important impact on population growth. Still, it does seem to be the case that forest areas receded
particularly markedly from the 16th century onwards (e.g., Young 1978). In this light it would appear reasonable to regard
expansion of agricultural land expansion as a potential problem for identification.
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on account of Rforest picking up the influence from other religious orders.23
Our main IV results are reported in Table 4. We focus on two basic specifications: our baseline specifi-
cation and the “full specification” (cf. column 7, Table 2). Cistercian influence is measured in two diﬀerent
ways; as the Cistercian share and as the Cistercian presence, a binary indicator of whether Cistercians are
present or not in the county. In this manner we can assess the impact of Cistercians both along the extensive
margin (Cistercian presence) and the intensive margin (Cistercian share), where in the latter case we use the
measure featuring the highest 2 in the OLS setting. Moreover, we look at two periods. The full period from
1377-1801 (columns 1-4) and the post-dissolution period from 1600-1801 (columns 5-8). The motivation for
the period split is to gauge whether the Cistercians have influenced the growth process beyond the period
where they were physically present.
[Table 4 about here]
Several observations are worthwhile. Rforest is a strong instrument for whether Cistercians were present
in a county or not, cf. the Kleibergen-Paap statistic. In some cases when the Cistercian share indicator is
used the instrument turns weak. But, as established via the Anderson-Rubin test, the Cistercians do appear
to exert a causal impact on population growth both before and after the dissolution of the Monasteries,
and this being regardless of the way their influence is actually measured. To gauge the robustness of the
IV results above we have examined the consequences of widening the window of observation to the period
1290-1801; i.e. by nearly an additional century, which allows us to take an initial year before the plague hit
England. The results, which are reported in Appendix Table A4, are very similar to those reported in Table
4.
As can be seen upon comparing the results in Tables 2-4, IV estimates exceed OLS counterparts by
roughly a factor of two. One possible explanation is that OLS suﬀers from a negative bias due to omitted
confounders. Our preferred interpretation, however, is attenuation bias resulting from the obvious fact
that our indicators of Cistercian presence are imperfect indicators of the fraction of the population with
“Protestant ethics”.
The impact of the Cistercians appears economically significant. To see this, observe from Table 4 that
countries with at least one Cistercian monastery had about 0.5 log points faster growth in population density
between 1377 and 1801 compared to counties that were “untreated”. This is equivalent to an acceleration
in average annual population growth of about 1/10th of a percentage point. During the period in question,
average cross-county population growth was 0.16 percent per year (with a standard deviation of 0.13 percent
23For completeness we also considered the possibility that total religious houses is an endogenous regressor. As demonstrated
in Table A5, our instrument - Royal Forest - is not correlated with total religious houses, conditional on our choice of the
controls. Table A6 reports the second stage results (Table A5 contain first stage results), where total religious houses are
omitted from the control set. Evidently, with a full set of controls, Cistercian presence remains a significant determinant of
population growth, regardless of the choice of period (1290-; 1377-; 1600-).
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per year). Hence the impact of the Cistercians is clearly economically significant.
In sum, we believe a strong case can be made that the Cistercian order had a causal impact on population
growth in England during the pre-demographic transition period, consistent with an impact on productivity.
The eﬀect is found both before and after the Dissolution of the Monasteries and it appears to be economically
significant.
4 The Legacy of the Cistercians: Values and Economic Outcomes
Across Europe
The above analysis makes probable that Cistercian monasteries left a lingering impact on county-level pro-
ductivity in England. Yet so far we have not narrowed down the mechanism. It could be that the Cistercians
simply managed to provide some areas with a technological lead, which was expanded after the Dissolution
of the Monasteries. To be sure, this is a viable candidate explanation which could potentially motivate the
results above, with little or no mentioning of cultural change. If indeed the Cistercians had an impact on
cultural values, and in light of the likely persistence of cultural values, perhaps we can detect a lingering
impact on present-day cultural values and economic outcomes influenced by the selfsame cultural values?
This is the question to which we now turn.
4.1 Cistercians and Contemporary Values
In order to examine the potential influence of the Cistercians on values we estimate the following individual-
level regression:
 = 0 + 1 () + 2 + b0W + γ0W +  +  (10)
where  refers to cultural values (work ethic or thrift, respectively) of individual  who is residing in
sub-region  of country . As described below, we can observe the location of individuals in Europe, which is
partitioned into so-called NUTS2 sub-regions (). We observe Cistercian presence at the NUTS2 level, and
we measure it chiefly as Cistercian density, (), since we do not have data on all religious houses across
Europe; other variations are also employed, however, as explained below. W is a vector of individual-level
co-variates: age, age squared, sex of the respondent, educational attainment, marital status, and the religious
denomination of the respondent. W captures geographical information at the NUTS2 level, latitude and
longitude, and  represents a country fixed eﬀect. Finally,  is a noise term. The parameter of interest is
1, which represents the link between the intensity of the Cistercian historical presence and individual-level
values with regards to thrift and hard work. We estimate equation (10) as a logistic regression model. In
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order to check the robustness of our results we further examine the Cistercians/values link by aggregating
the responses to the NUTS2 level. In these regressions the left hand side variable becomes the fraction of
respondents that find hard work and thrift to be important values to pass on to their children. We return
to these results below.
We measure Protestant values according to whether the individual believes hard work and thrift, respec-
tively, are important traits for children to learn at home; this is similar to McCleary and Barro (2006), who
examine Weber’s hypothesis at the country level. The data derives from the European Values survey (EVS),
and the latest wave (2008-10) provides information about the location of individuals at the NUTS2 level.
More specifically, we have information about where the respondent lived when he or she was 14 years old.
We code the individual as belonging to this particular region. The rationale is that values are predominantly
formed during childhood. In total we have access to data for 56,227 individuals (See Appendix for further
details).
In order to measure the Cistercian influence we employ data on the location of European Cistercian
monasteries from Donkin (1978). Donkin’s map is reproduced in Figure 6. Using GIS software and a shapefile
of European NUTS regions, we construct a variable measuring the number of Cistercian monasteries per
NUTS2 region across Europe. To make sure that we use only the regions included in Donkin’s map, we
restrict our sample to regions with a centroid between longitudes -10 and 26 and latitudes 37 to 63. This
leaves us with a total of 32,641 respondents from the EVS that we were able to match with the data on
Cistercian monasteries. To capture Cistercian density we divide the number of Cistercian monasteries by
the size of the geographical area of the NUTS2 region. We exclude three NUTS2 regions from the analysis
throughout as our analysis revealed they constitute outliers: Inner London, Outer London, and Brabant
Wallon in Belgium. If individuals from these areas are included in the analysis the link between the cultural
values and Cistercian presence is strengthened. With these sample restrictions we are left with a sample of
32,358 individuals who grew up in 242 diﬀerent NUTS2 regions across Europe.
Table 5 reports the results from estimating equation (10). The first four columns focus on hard work,
whereas the last four examine thrift. In columns 1 and 5 we examine a baseline specification without
individual-level controls, whereas they are added in columns 2 and 6. In the remaining columns we examine
the interaction with Protestantism in two diﬀerent ways: In columns 3 and 7 we control for the religious
denomination of the respondent, and in columns 4 and 8 we only consider respondents that report they are
Catholic.
[Table 5 about here]
In all specifications greater Cistercian density appears to elevate the likelihood that the respondent values
hard work. It is perhaps revealing to observe that once we only examine Catholics, the influence from the
Cistercians increases considerably. This is consistent with the idea that the Reformation led to the diﬀusion
25
Figure 6: Map of the historic location of Cistercian monasteries across Europe. Source: Donkin (1978).
of ideas similar to those promulgated by the Cistercians, thereby serving to mute the historical influence from
the latter on contemporary outcomes in Protestant regions. In contrast, however, we find little evidence of an
impact of the Cistercians with regards to thrift; in all settings the correlation (albeit positive, as expected)
is insignificant.
Figure 7: Cistercian density versus values across NUTS2 regions of Europe. The left figure shows the link to hard work
and the right figure shows the link to thrift. Variation in hard work and thrift caused by the individual-level baseline
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controls (W) is first removed in the individual sample, then aggregated to the regional level, and then regressed on
Cistercian share and the remaining regional-level controls. The partial correlations correspond to columns 4 and 8 in
Appendix Table A7.
In Table 6 we attempt to gauge the robustness of the link between the Cistercians and contemporary
values in two ways. First, we measure the influence from the Cistercians in several alternative ways in
addition to Cistercian density. We include total Cistercian monasteries linearly, log transformed, and as a
0/1 indicator for whether the individual NUTS2 sub-region hosted at least one Cistercian monastery. Second,
we vary the sample. That is, we first look at all European regions, then we focus on Catholics, and finally
we restrict the sample to England. The latter, of course, in an eﬀort to see if the Cistercians indeed left a
cultural imprint on the English population, consistent with our results from Section 3.
[Table 6 about here]
As can be seen from Table 6, the link between Cistercian presence and hard work appears rather robust. It
is generally found no matter how we measure the Cistercian influence, and in all sub-samples. In particular, in
the non-Protestant sample every indicator carries significant explanatory power. These results are consistent
with a cultural impact of the Cistercians in terms of work ethics across Europe in general as well as within
England specifically. The latter results further support our interpretation of the significant impact from the
Cistercians on population growth in England that we documented above.
The results with regards to thrift are less strong, and only in one case do we obtain a significant partial
correlation between Cistercian historical locations and thrift.
Things change, however, when we aggregate to the NUTS2 level and examine the determinants of the
fraction of respondents at the NUTS2 level valuing hard work and thrift (results are reported in Appendix
Table A7). For hard work we find results that are qualitatively similar to those pertaining to the individual-
level: Areas with greater Cistercian density harbor a larger fraction of respondents who find hard work to
be a value worth passing on to their children. For thrift the results are now somewhat stronger. The partial
correlation between  and the fraction of respondents who find thrift to be a value worth passing on
to their children is positive and significant at conventional levels in all but one column. Figure 7 depicts
the partial correlation between Cistercian density and hard work and thrift, respectively. It is clear that no
particular region or group of regions seems to be driving the results in either case.
Overall we conclude that the Cistercians do appear to have had a lasting impact on cultural values,
though most strongly with regards to hard work. Interestingly, these results appear to be economically
stronger in the context of non-Protestants, consistent with the view that Protestantism also brought similar
values to bear albeit considerably later in history.
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4.2 The Cistercians and Contemporary Economic Outcomes
If indeed the Cistercians left a cultural imprint on the values of European citizens, it is of interest to see
if their influence is also detectable on present-day economic outcomes. The historical analysis for England
suggests the Cistercians led to higher productivity as reflected in greater population density. In a modern
day context it is inappropriate to use population density as a marker for productivity, for which reason we
use employment at the sub-national level as the key outcome variable in the context of contemporary Europe.
The logic is simple. If the Cistercians eventually led to higher productivity in some regions compared to
others, labor should be attracted to the former thereby raising the ratio of employment to population size.
To investigate whether this is the case we estimate the following model:
log () = 0 + 1 () + 2 + b0W +  +  (11)
where log () is the (log of) total regional employment at time  at the NUTS2 sub-regional level  in
region . In practice we look at the year 2007 (i.e.,  = 2007), which is the year before the financial crisis.24
In addition to Cistercian density, ()  we control for a set of variables that vary across NUTS2 sub-
regions (W): geography, in the sense of latitude and longitude, and demography, in the form of the average
age of the local population. The (log) size of the population is also included in W, which means that a
significant coeﬃcient for 1, the link between Cistercian density and contemporary employment, speaks to
a higher employment rate in sub-region . As seen from equation (11) we also include a full set of NUTS1
fixed eﬀects, .
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Figure 8: (log) Cistercian monasteries versus (log) employment and (log) GDP, respectively. Corresponds to columns
3 and 7 of Table 7, respectively.
24The results are qualitatively similar if we examine 2005, 2006, 2008, or 2009, though significance is slightly reduced in the
years 2005 and 2006, presumably because of fewer observations.
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The link between productivity and total employment is theoretically mediated by labor mobility. But
if labor is (fully) mobile, another proposition follows. Namely that high productivity and high employ-
ment regions should not distinguish themselves in terms of labor productivity. Incipient labor productivity
diﬀerences, and thus wage diﬀerences, is what theoretically drives mobility, leading to a reallocation of em-
ployment. In this process, labor productivity is reduced in the high productivity regions due to diminishing
returns. Hence, in the absence of large frictions to labor mobility at the NUTS2 sub-regional level we would
not expect to see a link between Cistercian historical influence and current labor productivity (i.e., GDP
per employed). In order to check, we therefore also examine the impact of the Cistercians on GDP per em-
ployed. The specification mirrors equation (11) though with (log) GDP as left hand side variable, and with
employment on the right hand side in place of total population. The sources for our data on employment,
population and GDP at the NUTS2 level are laid out in the Appendix; summary statistics are found in
Table A8.
Table 7 reports the results. In the first four columns we focus on employment (rates), whereas the last
four columns concern GDP (per employed). Cistercian presence is measured in four diﬀerent ways; as density,
(); as presence (0/1); as total Cistercian monasteries, Cistercians; and as log(1 + Cistercians).
Regardless of how we measure Cistercian presence, we find a statistically significant correlation with
employment rates, as seen from columns 1-4, consistent with the hypothesis under scrutiny. Economically,
the eﬀect is non-trivial: regions “treated” with Cistercian presence have on average 2.5% higher employment,
cf. column 4.
Columns 5-8 turns to GDP (per employed). Consistent with high labor mobility at the sub-regional level
across Europe, we find no statistically significant impact of the Cistercians as implied by the reallocation
argument discussed above: High productivity sub-regions draw in labor, which serves simultaneously to
elevate the employment rate and eliminate labor productivity diﬀerences.
[Table 7 about here]
Figure 8 shows the partial correlation between the Cistercians and employment and GDP, respectively,
conditional on the co-variates mentioned above. Specifically, Figure 8 depicts the estimates reported in
columns 3 and 7. The results do not seem to be driven by any particular regions.
These results, and those from the previous section, paint a coherent picture. When we examine the
link between Cistercian historical presence and contemporary values related to work ethics in particular, we
find systematically that the latter are more pervasive in places with more Cistercian monasteries. To the
extent that work ethics influence productivity, one would expect to see higher employment rates in areas
that were exposed to Cistercians if labor mobility is suﬃciently high. This is exactly what we see in the
data. These results provide strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis under examination: the Order of
Cistercians instigated changes in cultural values in local populations, which worked to influence growth and
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development in the long run.
5 Concluding Remarks
The present paper documents that the Order of Cistercians left a lingering imprint on long-run comparative
development across English counties during the pre-industrial era. In counties with greater Cistercian pres-
ence population growth was faster during the period 1377-1801, suggesting that the Cistercians stimulated
productivity. The Catholic monasteries were dissolved by 1540 in England. Hence our results suggest that
the regional impact of the Cistercian order was felt more than 250 years after the Order’s discontinuation
in England. This finding is robust and IV estimates suggest that the correlation can be given a causal
interpretation.
We have also oﬀered a mechanism behind our finding, namely that the Cistercians ignited a process of
growth through cultural change. That is, a gradual change in local populations in terms of taste for hard
work and thrift, much like Max Weber suggested was the end result of the Protestant reformation.
We think this explanation is plausible for the following reasons. First, a cultural concordance between
the Cistercians and the Protestants in the dimensions of work ethics and thrift has already been observed
by several scholars, including Weber himself. Second, the cultural explanation has the virtue of being able
to account for the lingering Cistercian influence on growth. Third, consistent with the cultural mechanism,
using data from the European Values Survey we find that Catholic regions in Europe, which historically
were influenced relatively more by the Cistercians, tend to have populations with greater taste for hard work
and, to a lesser extent, thrift today. These results carry over to England as well as to Europe more broadly.
Fourth, given free mobility in the labor market, one would expect to see sub-regions with higher productivity
to also feature higher employment rates. This suggests that regions that were “treated” by Cistercian
monasteries historically should feature higher employment rates today, if indeed there is a lingering impact
on productivity. This is exactly what we find. Hence, the Cistercian order seems to have had a lasting
impact on economic development in Europe.
Overall, our research suggests that Weber was right in stressing the importance of a cultural appreciation
of hard work and thrift but quite likely wrong in tracing the origins of these values to the Protestant
reformation.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Regional analysis for England
Religious Houses in England. The data on religious houses is available from: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/
history2/englishmonasticarchives/religioushouses/index.php.
 
Figure A1. The figure shows the data on land quality (left panel) and on waterways (right panel) discussed below.
Land quality. Natural England provides a measure of agricultural land classified into five grades plus
classifications for non-agricultural and urban land. Grade one is best quality and grade five is poorest quality,
grade six is non-agricultural land and grade seven is urban. The measure is calculated by Natural England
using information on climate (temperature, rainfall, aspect, exposure, frost risk), site (gradient, micro-relief,
flood risk) and soil (depth, structure, texture, chemicals, stoniness). The source of the data is Raster Digital
mapping with a scale of 1:250,000, which is available online at: http://www.gis.naturalengland.org.uk/
pubs/gis/gis_register.asp.25 The data was gathered with coordinate precision of 1 meter. We used these
data to create a measure of agricultural land quality within each county. The earliest digital map of English
counties is from 1851. These data were kindly provided to us by the University of Portsmouth and the
Great Britain Historical GIS Project. Combining the shapefile including the agricultural land quality and
the shapefile including English county borders, we were able to create measures of the area in a county with
agricultural land of quality level 1-5, each as a share of total county area; the total county area was here
calculated by summing over the land quality variable, since this variable spans the entire area. Our variable
25Additional Data description is also available online at: http://www.magic.gov.uk/datadoc/metadata.asp?dataset=2&x=16&y=10
and http://naturalengland.etraderstores.com/NaturalEnglandShop/ product.aspx?ProductID=88ﬀ926a-3177-4090-aecb-
00e6c9030b29.
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“land quality” is the combination of qualities 1 and 2.
Access to Water. The German company Geofabrik freely provides shapefiles on various geographic fea-
tures.26 Of our interest is their data on waterways in Great Britain, where waterways are divided into canal,
dock, drain, moat, river, and stream. These data are available online at: http://download.geofabrik.de/
osm/europe/great_britain/. As with the data on agricultural land quality, we merge the shapefile describ-
ing waterways with the shapefile describing the county borders of England. The outcome of interest from
this procedure is the total length of rivers as a share of the total area in a county (rivershare). In addition
oceandummy equals one if the county borders the ocean, zero otherwise.
Coal. Allen (2009) and Pomeranz (2000) argue that proximity to coal production was critical for British
industrialization because it supplied an inexhaustible supply of cheap energy. We therefore construct a
variable called coalshare, measured as the surface area of coalfields to total area in 1871.27 The map of
coalfields is taken from Redmayne (1903).
Regional fixed eﬀects. The regional classification that we employ is based on Government Oﬃce
regions: East Midlands, East of England, London, North East, North West, South East, South West, West
Midlands, and Yorkshire and the Humber.
A.2 Values and Outcomes across Europe.
Values and individual level controls. The data derives from the European Values Survey, which is avail-
able online at http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu. We focus on the 2008-10 wave as detailed information
of the place of residency at age 14 (NUTS2 level) is available. We use whether respondents indicate that
they think that valuing “hard work” is an important trait for children to learn at home (variable a030 in
EVS) and whether they think “thrift, saving money and things” is an important trait for children to learn
at home (variable a038 in EVS). In Appendix tables we also aggregate to the NUTS2 level, which means
the variable becomes the fraction of respondents (appropriately weighted) that subscribe to thrift and hard
work. The EVS is also the source of the individual level controls highlighted in the text.
Cistercian presence. Derives from Donkin (1978). Shapefiles for NUTS regions were obtained from
eurostat.com.
Employment, Population and GDP per employed. For the outcomes regressions, employment,
population, and total GDP is measured at the NUTS2 level and provided by EuroStat (ec.europa.eu/eurostat).
Employed persons is the total number of employed persons aged 15-64. Population is total persons living in
the NUTS2 region. GDP is total regional gross domestic product in million PPS.
26These shapefiles are based on maps created by the OpenStreetMap project using data from portable GPS devices, aerial
photography, other free sources, or simply from local knowledge.
27A coalfield is an area of certain uniform characteristics where coal is mined.
32
B Additional Results Appendix
[Insert Tables A1 - A8]
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Table 1a: Summary statistics Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Cistercian share 40 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.25
Religious houses 40 19.03 12.93 2.00 73.00
Pop dens 1377 40 31.55 11.83 8.98 52.98
Pop dens 1600 40 29.99 6.46 13.97 43.33
Pop dens 1801 40 60.45 24.82 20.92 143.77
Augustinian share 40 0.28 0.13 0.00 0.62
Benedictine share 40 0.31 0.16 0.00 0.67
Cluniac share 40 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.15
Premonstratensian share 40 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.50
Table 1b: Correlation matrix
Cistercian share 1
Religious houses 0.01 1
Pop dens 1377 -0.28 0.31 1
Pop dens 1600 -0.01 0.01 0.45 1
Pop dens 1801 0.32 -0.16 -0.06 0.57 1
Augustinian share -0.10 -0.12 0.35 0.23 0.30 1
Benedictine share -0.15 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.05 -0.27 1
Cluniac share -0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.34 0.26 0.18 -0.15 1
Premonstratensian share -0.18 -0.07 -0.33 -0.24 -0.14 -0.22 -0.46 0.02 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES
Cistercian share 1.934** 1.977* 1.931** 1.751** 1.808** 1.921** 1.702**
(0.887) (1.078) (0.916) (0.798) (0.670) (0.876) (0.644)
Pop dens 1377 (log) -0.614*** -0.482** -0.606*** -0.438** -0.474*** -0.601*** -0.374**
(0.171) (0.235) (0.186) (0.173) (0.138) (0.192) (0.142)
Religious houses -0.00682* -0.00615* -0.00683* -0.0170*** -0.00541 -0.00740* -0.0124***
(0.00376) (0.00359) (0.00376) (0.00400) (0.00377) (0.00417) (0.00355)
Land quality -0.634* -0.682* -0.634* -0.536* -0.540 -0.635* -0.486
(0.313) (0.350) (0.315) (0.297) (0.325) (0.319) (0.312)
rivershare 0.267
(1.940)
Area (log) 0.303** 0.203**
(0.113) (0.0967)
Coal 1.587*** 1.391**
(0.535) (0.517)
Ocean 0.0279
(0.128)
Regional FE NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.641 0.678 0.641 0.676 0.712 0.641 0.727
Population growth 1377-1801
Notes. (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (ii) All regressions contain a constant.
Table 2. Baseline Results: The Cistercians and Cross-County Development
Table 3: Alternative indicators of Cistercian influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Cistercian share 1.934** 1.702**
(0.887) (0.644)
Cistercians 0.0840** 0.0711**
(0.0408) (0.0296)
Cistercian presence 0.262* 0.223
(0.153) (0.133)
Cistercian density (/km2) 198.4* 188.6**
(106.8) (84.62)
Area 0.000114* -3.92e-05
(6.48e-05) (4.95e-05)
Pop dens 1377 (log) -0.614*** -0.640*** -0.715*** -0.533*** -0.374** -0.379** -0.467*** -0.448***
(0.171) (0.181) (0.188) (0.194) (0.142) (0.155) (0.161) (0.163)
Religious houses -0.00682* -0.0130** -0.00891** -0.0188*** -0.0124*** -0.0190*** -0.0133*** -0.0138***
(0.00376) (0.00535) (0.00362) (0.00667) (0.00355) (0.00543) (0.00387) (0.00451)
Land quality -0.634* -0.605** -0.573* -0.563* -0.486 -0.451 -0.436 -0.473
(0.313) (0.298) (0.320) (0.323) (0.312) (0.308) (0.305) (0.306)
Area (log) 0.203** 0.245** 0.180* 0.362***
(0.0967) (0.110) (0.104) (0.0923)
Coal 1.391** 1.334** 1.498** 1.432**
(0.517) (0.565) (0.571) (0.563)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.641 0.611 0.609 0.629 0.727 0.702 0.700 0.705
Population growth 1377-1801
Notes. (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (ii) All regressions contain a constant. (iii) "Cistercian share" 
measures total cistercian houses relative to all religious houses in the county; "Cistercians"  is  total Cistercian houses; "Cistercian presence" is a 
dummy taking on the value 1 if just one Cistercian house is found, and "Cistercian density" is the number of cistercian houses per square kilometer.
Table 4. IV results: Full period and the "post-dissolution" period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
Cistercian share 3.399* 2.752** 3.485* 3.883**
(1.804) (1.203) (1.793) (1.829)
Cistercian presence (0/1) 0.515* 0.444* 0.469* 0.501**
(0.305) (0.240) (0.241) (0.234)
Pop density 1377 (log) -0.505** -0.341** -0.686*** -0.505***
(0.197) (0.136) (0.174) (0.156)
Pop density 1600 (log) 0.123 0.142 0.076 0.137
(0.265) (0.246) (0.166) (0.152)
Religious houses -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.004 0.001 -0.010*** -0.005*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Land quality -0.608** -0.491* -0.485 -0.392 -0.421 -0.373 -0.496** -0.360
(0.287) (0.290) (0.321) (0.297) (0.268) (0.259) (0.240) (0.233)
Area (log) 0.147 0.085 -0.147 -0.082
(0.111) (0.142) (0.175) (0.131)
Coal 1.332*** 1.531*** 1.079** 1.464***
(0.484) (0.536) (0.497) (0.492)
Forest share -0.391* -0.222 -0.369* -0.228 -0.286 -0.302 -0.295* -0.240
(0.223) (0.231) (0.216) (0.246) (0.187) (0.258) (0.173) (0.215)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Kleibergen-Paap 16.63 12.25 40.99 20.91 16.65 10.98 43.08 25.30
Anderson-Rubin (p-value) 0.0931 0.0425 0.0931 0.0425 0.0427 0.0137 0.0427 0.0137
Dependent variable:
Rforest 0.102*** 0.0980*** 0.672*** 0.608*** 0.0872*** 0.0778*** 0.648*** 0.602***
(0.0250) (0.0280) (0.105) (0.133) (0.0214) (0.0235) (0.0987) (0.120)
Pop density 1377 (log) -0.0690* -0.0589 -0.104 0.00500
(0.0344) (0.0408) (0.107) (0.123)
Pop density 1600 (log) -0.0139 0.00688 -0.00251 0.0630
(0.0507) (0.0515) (0.162) (0.148)
Religious houses 0.00178** 0.00149 0.0200*** 0.0129** 0.00107 -1.44e-05 0.0189*** 0.0128**
(0.000816) (0.00136) (0.00428) (0.00626) (0.000747) (0.00134) (0.00371) (0.00539)
Land quality -0.0161 -0.0102 -0.345 -0.288 -0.0820 -0.0348 -0.450 -0.296
(0.0687) (0.0696) (0.481) (0.518) (0.0612) (0.0651) (0.448) (0.517)
Area (log) 0.00949 0.199 0.0429 0.203
(0.0310) (0.174) (0.0308) (0.155)
Coal 0.0475 -0.152 0.0807 -0.144
(0.119) (0.616) (0.128) (0.583)
Forest share 0.0343 0.0416 0.183 0.271 0.0188 0.0516 0.159 0.274
(0.0464) (0.0511) (0.266) (0.284) (0.0489) (0.0529) (0.267) (0.283)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared (First stage) 0.302 0.308 0.459 0.482 0.168 0.248 0.449 0.483
Population growth 1377-1801 Population growth 1600-1801
Second stage
Cistercian share Cistercian Presence Cistercian Share Cistercian Presence
First stage
Table 5. Logit of values on Cistercian density across individuals in Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
Cistercians as share of area 290.991** 314.301** 316.153* 530.757*** 75.268 75.938 127.636 314.192
(133.282) (130.718) (171.451) (192.081) (152.100) (134.900) (179.991) (196.735)
Area, km2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 32,358 31,953 22,230 16,282 31,945 31,542 21,880 15,984
Pseudo R-squared 0.251 0.261 0.282 0.223 0.0477 0.0615 0.0713 0.0468
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline controls N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Religion dummies N N Y N N N Y N
Sample full full full cath full full full cath
hardwork thrift
Logit estimates. Robust standard errors in paranthesis, clustered at the country level. ***,**,* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. All regressions contain a 
constant term. Baseline controls are age, age squared, a dummy for males, married, educational attainment, absolute latitude, and longitude. Religion dummies refers to whether 
or not dummies for Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, Free Church, and Judaism are included. Sample refers to whether the full sample is 
included or whether the sample is restricted to only Catholics. The latter is the case in columns 4 and 8.
Table 6. Values in Europe, alternative specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (3) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable:
Cistercian share 316.153* 127.636
(171.451) (179.991)
Cistercians 0.020** 0.026** 0.003 0.016*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009)
Cistercians (log) 0.125** -0.002
(0.057) (0.059)
Cistercian presence 0.097 -0.036
(0.079) (0.080)
Area, km2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Area (log) -0.112** -0.082 0.097* 0.103**
(0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.049)
Observations 22,230 22,230 22,084 22,230 22,230 21,880 21,880 21,738 21,880 21,880
R-squared 0.282 0.282 0.284 0.282 0.282 0.0713 0.0713 0.0721 0.0718 0.0718
Cistercian share 533.956*** 314.733
(192.375) (196.204)
Cistercians 0.025** 0.034*** -0.001 0.014
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010)
Cistercians (log) 0.163*** -0.015
(0.059) (0.066)
Cistercian presence 0.153** -0.019
(0.074) (0.094)
Area, km2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Area (log) -0.124** -0.089 0.109 0.107
(0.048) (0.056) (0.076) (0.070)
Observations 16,282 16,282 16,148 16,282 16,282 15,984 15,984 15,851 15,984 15,984
R-squared 0.224 0.223 0.226 0.224 0.223 0.0468 0.0465 0.0474 0.0471 0.0471
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Religion dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample full ex Midland full full full ex Midland full full
Cistercian share 439.086*** 110.691
(122.939) (282.894)
Cistercians 0.104*** -0.006
(0.035) (0.054)
(Log) Cistercians 0.347** 0.063
(0.144) (0.189)
Cistercian presence 0.196 -0.089
(0.217) (0.345)
Area, km2 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(Log) Area -0.362*** -0.221* 0.104 0.181
(0.120) (0.116) (0.172) (0.178)
Observations 1,085 1,085 1,085 1,085 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088
R-squared 0.0144 0.0144 0.0131 0.0110 0.0571 0.0570 0.0558 0.0558
Baseline controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample full full full full full full full full
hardwork thrift
Panel A: Full sample
Panel B. Catholics only
Panel C. England
Logit estimates. Robust standard errors in paranthesis, clustered at the country level in panels A and B, clustered at the nuts2 level in Panel C. ***,**,* indicates significance at 
1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. All regressions contain a constant term. Sample refers to whether the full sample is included or whether the sample excludes the region of 
"Border, Midland, and Westland" in Ireland, when this is an outlier. Baseline controls are age, age squared, a dummy for males, married, educational attainment, absolute 
latitude, and longitude.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
Cistercian share 55.158** 42.563
(22.917) (58.000)
Cistercians 0.004* 0.009
(0.002) (0.007)
Cistercians (log) 0.026*** 0.033
(0.008) (0.042)
Cistercian presence 0.025* -0.011
(0.013) (0.057)
Population 2007 (log) 0.986*** 0.984*** 0.984*** 0.989***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Employment 2007 (log) 1.087*** 1.078*** 1.096*** 1.108***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.032) (0.029)
Area, km2 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Area (log) -0.011 -0.005 -0.166*** -0.149***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.036) (0.032)
Observations 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.978 0.978 0.983 0.983
NUTS1 FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Baseline controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
No scale effects p value 0.269 0.219 0.204 0.428 0.0253 0.0616 0.00579 0.00104
(Log) employment 2007 (Log) Gross Regional Product 2007
Table 7. OLS of outcomes on Cistercians across European regions
OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in paranthesis, clustered at the country level. Observations are nuts2 regions. ***,**,* indicates 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. All regressions contain a constant term. Baseline controls are average age, latitude and 
longitude. No scale effects is the p-value of the test of (log) Population = 0 in columns 1-4 and (log) Employment = 0 in columns 5-10.
Table A1. Population growth and the Benetictine Order
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES
Benedictine share 0.0148 -0.246 0.0301 0.152 0.131 -0.0351 0.213
(0.368) (0.489) (0.353) (0.374) (0.350) (0.344) (0.347)
Pop dens 1377 (log) -0.709*** -0.464* -0.695*** -0.492** -0.555*** -0.678*** -0.421**
(0.193) (0.239) (0.210) (0.194) (0.160) (0.211) (0.160)
Religious houses -0.00560 -0.00421 -0.00563 -0.0179*** -0.00422 -0.00683 -0.0133***
(0.00390) (0.00302) (0.00385) (0.00500) (0.00398) (0.00427) (0.00381)
Land quality -0.651** -0.712** -0.650** -0.529* -0.547* -0.653** -0.474
(0.282) (0.308) (0.284) (0.311) (0.305) (0.285) (0.320)
rivershare 0.463
(2.114)
Area (log) 0.362** 0.261**
(0.152) (0.115)
Coal 1.699** 1.457**
(0.707) (0.633)
Ocean 0.0596
(0.150)
Regional FE No Yes No No No No No
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.577 0.631 0.578 0.627 0.658 0.579 0.682
Notes. (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (ii) All regressions contain a constant.
Population growth 1377-1801
Table A2. Population growth, Cistercians and other religious orders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Pop dens 1377 (log) -0.374** -0.360** -0.446** -0.439*** -0.420** -0.485**
(0.142) (0.133) (0.178) (0.144) (0.156) (0.236)
Cistercian share 1.702** 1.789*** 1.700** 1.839** 1.531** 2.134**
(0.644) (0.647) (0.656) (0.691) (0.695) (0.967)
Religious houses -0.0124*** -0.0132*** -0.0116*** -0.0105*** -0.0119*** -0.0113**
(0.00355) (0.00349) (0.00361) (0.00330) (0.00370) (0.00465)
Land quality -0.486 -0.469 -0.442 -0.427 -0.517 -0.306
(0.312) (0.332) (0.280) (0.285) (0.333) (0.379)
Area (log) 0.203** 0.224** 0.205* 0.127 0.196* 0.175
(0.0967) (0.103) (0.109) (0.123) (0.104) (0.159)
Coal 1.391** 1.429*** 1.227* 1.296** 1.359** 1.152*
(0.517) (0.497) (0.610) (0.552) (0.524) (0.599)
Benedictine share 0.316 0.614
(0.319) (0.517)
Augustinian share 0.446 0.661
(0.638) (0.614)
Cluniac share 1.494 1.497
(1.329) (1.288)
Premon share -0.446 0.329
(0.622) (1.096)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.727 0.735 0.735 0.739 0.731 0.764
Population growth 1377-1801
Notes. (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (ii) All regressions contain a 
constant
Table A3. Instrument falsification: Royal Forest and other Monastic Orders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
Rforest 0.0134 -0.00561 -0.120 -0.109 0.0260 0.0238 -0.0804 -0.0751
(0.0219) (0.0201) (0.127) (0.141) (0.0650) (0.0750) (0.0950) (0.0916)
Pop dens 1377 (log) 0.00819 0.0480** 0.0251 -0.00370 0.126** 0.154** -0.0553 -0.0714
(0.0193) (0.0214) (0.0573) (0.0895) (0.0509) (0.0627) (0.0354) (0.0582)
Religious houses 0.000498 -0.00136* -7.06e-05 0.000812 -0.00195 -0.00132 -0.000437 -0.000102
(0.000640) (0.000742) (0.00237) (0.00334) (0.00143) (0.00246) (0.00152) (0.00193)
Land quality -0.0601 -0.0379 -0.0223 -0.0392 -0.120 -0.101 -0.0507 -0.0605
(0.0414) (0.0470) (0.160) (0.156) (0.119) (0.122) (0.0428) (0.0446)
Area (log) 0.0549*** -0.0286 -0.00769 -0.0122
(0.0179) (0.0622) (0.0611) (0.0324)
Coal 0.0662 -0.126 0.374* -0.0968
(0.0810) (0.428) (0.209) (0.277)
Forest share 0.00970 0.0400 0.176** 0.155* -0.00627 0.0112 -0.0136 -0.0250
(0.0305) (0.0303) (0.0766) (0.0799) (0.0699) (0.0745) (0.0288) (0.0320)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.051 0.229 0.088 0.099 0.192 0.261 0.235 0.248
Dependent variable:
Rforest 0.191 -0.0578 0.210 0.204 0.207 0.204 0.0883 0.0483
(0.257) (0.195) (0.191) (0.198) (0.198) (0.176) (0.244) (0.262)
Pop dens 1377 (log) 0.155 0.616** 0.0508 0.0552 0.0104 0.0639 -0.161 -0.101
(0.220) (0.258) (0.0652) (0.129) (0.0880) (0.121) (0.196) (0.270)
Religious houses 0.00829 -0.0182** 0.00530 0.00440 0.00388 0.00520 0.0202*** 0.0155*
(0.00779) (0.00885) (0.00342) (0.00402) (0.00310) (0.00448) (0.00490) (0.00882)
Land quality -0.795 -0.547 0.0865 0.0877 0.198 0.234 -0.711* -0.682*
(0.496) (0.547) (0.114) (0.0867) (0.229) (0.229) (0.351) (0.357)
Area (log) 0.754*** 0.0226 -0.0179 0.130
(0.179) (0.0609) (0.0805) (0.207)
Coal -0.0494 -0.107 0.728 -0.236
(0.714) (0.800) (0.445) (1.074)
Forest Share 0.145 0.507* 0.0543 0.0591 0.0172 0.0497 0.318 0.367
(0.321) (0.265) (0.0634) (0.0575) (0.0392) (0.0555) (0.258) (0.263)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.098 0.318 0.210 0.212 0.158 0.246 0.238 0.245
Panel A: Intensive margin
Cluniac presence Benedictine presence Augustinian presence Premon presence
Panel B: Extensive margin
Cluniac share Benedictine share Augustinian share Premon share
Table A4. Robustness:  IV estimates 1290-1801
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
Cistercian share 4.041* 4.086**
(2.342) (2.011)
Cistercian presence 0.616* 0.745**
(0.363) (0.352)
Pop dens 1290 (log) -0.683** -0.646** -0.963*** -1.062***
(0.270) (0.310) (0.164) (0.173)
land quality -0.447 -0.389 -0.168 -0.071
(0.349) (0.360) (0.388) (0.420)
Religious houses -0.008* -0.007 -0.013*** -0.003
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
Forest share -0.378 -0.341 -0.324 -0.399
(0.275) (0.297) (0.225) (0.297)
Area (log) -0.023 -0.293*
(0.169) (0.174)
Coal 0.825 1.317**
(0.565) (0.671)
Observations 40 40 40 40
K-P 12.18 13.52 32.44 25.46
A-R (p-value) 0.0858 0.0274 0.0858 0.0274
Dependent variable:
Rforest 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.667*** 0.602***
(0.0291) (0.0299) (0.117) (0.119)
Pop dens 1290 (log) -0.0854*** -0.0977*** -0.106 0.0231
(0.0260) (0.0338) (0.122) (0.125)
Land quality 0.0205 0.0233 -0.319 -0.299
(0.0678) (0.0660) (0.471) (0.504)
Religious Houses 0.00199** 0.00307** 0.0201*** 0.0123*
(0.000743) (0.00119) (0.00432) (0.00633)
Forest share 0.0421 0.0355 0.188 0.273
(0.0530) (0.0559) (0.270) (0.281)
Area (log) -0.0272 0.213
(0.0341) (0.178)
Coal 0.0917 -0.157
(0.105) (0.582)
Observations 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.393 0.410 0.460 0.482
Second stage
Population growth 1290-1801
Cistercian share Cistercian presence
First stage
Table A5. Robustness: Endogeniety of total religious houses?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES
Rforest -11.25 -9.105 -11.69 -9.800 -10.68 -8.662 0.442* 0.490*** 0.438* 0.482*** 0.446* 0.491***
(10.80) (5.671) (10.82) (6.540) (11.74) (7.896) (0.245) (0.125) (0.249) (0.158) (0.254) (0.173)
Pop dens 1290 (log) 7.977** 13.06*** 0.0544 0.183
(3.491) (2.387) (0.153) (0.109)
Pop dens 1377 (log) 8.316** 12.09*** 0.0619 0.161
(4.065) (2.593) (0.132) (0.115)
Pop dens 1600 (log) -0.0371 3.494 -0.00321 0.108
(8.100) (5.808) (0.167) (0.142)
land quality 9.246 3.749 10.78 8.572 21.00 18.54 -0.134 -0.253 -0.130 -0.178 -0.0528 -0.0582
(16.25) (9.424) (15.48) (9.516) (17.92) (12.92) (0.625) (0.533) (0.615) (0.537) (0.573) (0.524)
Area (log) 18.57*** 17.67*** 15.98*** 0.440*** 0.426*** 0.408***
(2.986) (3.109) (3.560) (0.1000) (0.0978) (0.0976)
Coal -24.58** -20.49** -37.94*** -0.459 -0.416 -0.630
(10.50) (8.011) (10.85) (0.604) (0.625) (0.529)
Forest share -7.281 4.551 -6.978 4.864 -5.576 4.409 0.0422 0.329 0.0434 0.333 0.0538 0.331
(10.60) (4.317) (9.505) (3.718) (9.560) (4.348) (0.263) (0.264) (0.259) (0.268) (0.265) (0.271)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
R-squared 0.236 0.766 0.236 0.724 0.165 0.608 0.147 0.446 0.148 0.435 0.144 0.417
Relgious houses (total) Cistercian presence (0/1)
Table A6. Robustness: IV estimates without control for total religious houses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable:
Cistercian presence 0.941 0.806** 0.880 0.724* 0.699* 0.591**
(0.613) (0.395) (0.631) (0.378) (0.423) (0.266)
Pop dens 1290 (log) -1.083*** -1.116***
(0.175) (0.155)
Pop dens 1377 (log) -0.822*** -0.717***
(0.201) (0.177)
Pop dens 1600 (log) 0.077 0.109
(0.191) (0.152)
Land quality -0.243 -0.068 -0.586 -0.460 -0.685* -0.449
(0.571) (0.445) (0.535) (0.426) (0.373) (0.276)
Forest share -0.245 -0.434 -0.289 -0.388 -0.254 -0.292
(0.240) (0.322) (0.215) (0.312) (0.192) (0.237)
Area (log) -0.380** -0.278 -0.200
(0.182) (0.199) (0.133)
Coal 1.425** 1.930*** 1.714***
(0.676) (0.596) (0.475)
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40
K-P 3.252 15.42 3.089 9.289 3.079 8.091
A-R (p-value) 0.0380 0.0275 0.0241 0.00391 0.0119 0.00613
Second stage
Population gr, 1290- Population gr, 1377- Population gr, 1600-
Table A7. OLS of values on Cistercians across regions in Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: hardwork thrift
Cistercian share 58.507 147.329*** 72.110 148.805*** 61.515** 124.756** 73.352 145.489**
(41.900) (31.961) (52.217) (40.581) (27.703) (45.269) (54.316) (67.159)
Area, km2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 242 174 241 174 242 174 241 174
R-squared 0.858 0.872 0.800 0.846 0.441 0.419 0.368 0.379
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample full prot<50% full prot<50% full prot<50% full prot<50%
No. countries 29 26 29 26 29 26 29 26
hardworkcond thriftcond
Robust standard errors in paranthesis, clustered at the country level. The unit of observation is nuts2 regions. ***,**,* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent, respectively. All regressions contain a constant term. Sample refers to whether the full sample is included or whether the sample is restricted to 
include only regions with a maximum of 50% Protestants. Hardworkcond is the residuals aggregated up to the nuts2 level of a regression of hardwork on age, 
age squared, a dummy for males, married, educational attainment, and religion dummies in the individual sample. Likewise for thrift. Regional controls are 
latitude and longitude.
Table A8. Summary Statistics across European regions
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hardwork 242 0.400 0.260 0.000 1.000
Hardworkcond 242 0.382 0.259 0.000 1.000
Thrift 242 0.369 0.145 0.000 0.908
Thriftcond 242 0.460 0.145 0.000 1.000
Cistercian share of total area 242 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Area 242 15323 15266 173 92961
Absolute latitude 242 48.893 5.048 37.589 62.329
Longitude 242 9.023 8.755 -9.046 25.476
Age 242 47.864 4.829 27.000 70.538
Protestants, share 241 0.294 0.356 0.000 1.000
(Log) employment 2007 241 13.383 0.710 10.931 15.462
(Log) Population 2007 242 14.205 0.708 11.735 16.266
(Log) Gross Regional Product 2007 235 10.435 0.808 8.302 13.141
Hardworkcond is the residuals aggregated up to the nuts2 level of a regression of hardwork on age, age squared, a dummy for males, 
married, educational attainment in the individual sample. Likewise for thrift.
